Writeup for Privacy
- Hello h4ck3r, welcome to the world of smart contract hacking. Solving the challenges from Ethernaut will help you understand Solidity better. For each challenge, a contract will be deployed, and an instance will be provided. Your task is to interact with the contract and exploit its vulnerabilities. Don’t worry if you are new to Solidity and have never deployed a smart contract. You can learn how to deploy a contract using Remix here.
Challenge Description
The creator of this contract was careful enough to protect the sensitive areas of its storage.
Unlock this contract to beat the level.
Things that might help:
- Understanding how storage works
- Understanding how parameter parsing works
- Understanding how casting works
Tips:
Remember that metamask is just a commodity. Use another tool if it is presenting problems. Advanced gameplay could involve using remix, or your web3 provider.
Contract Explanation
If you understand the contract, you can move to the exploit part. If you are a beginner, please go through the Contract Explanation as well. It will help you understand Solidity better.
Click to view source contract
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
3
4contract Privacy {
5 bool public locked = true;
6 uint256 public ID = block.timestamp;
7 uint8 private flattening = 10;
8 uint8 private denomination = 255;
9 uint16 private awkwardness = uint16(block.timestamp);
10 bytes32[3] private data;
11
12 constructor(bytes32[3] memory _data) {
13 data = _data;
14 }
15
16 function unlock(bytes16 _key) public {
17 require(_key == bytes16(data[2]));
18 locked = false;
19 }
20
21 /*
22 A bunch of super advanced solidity algorithms...
23
24 ,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`
25 .,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,
26 *.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^ ,---/V\
27 `*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*. ~|__(o.o)
28 ^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*'^`*.,*' UU UU
29 */
30}
The contract has six state variables named locked
, ID
, flattening
, denomination
, awkwardness
, and data
.
The state variable locked
is a boolean type and initialized to true. ID
is a uint256 which is initialized with block.timestamp
. flattening
is a uint8 and it is initialized with 10
. denomination
is a uint8 and it is initialized with 255
. awkwardness
is a uint16 and it is initialized with block.timestamp
converted into uint16. data
is a bytes32 array of length 3.
At this point, block.timestamp
will return a 4-byte number. The awkwardness
variable stores 2 bytes of block.timestamp
, which means out of 4 bytes, only 2 bytes will be stored in awkwardness, i.e., the last two bytes will be stored in awkwardness.
If block.timestamp
is 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000066f6e2d4, the bytes2 of block.timestamp
will return 0xe2d4.
1constructor(bytes32[3] memory _data) {
2 data = _data;
3}
The constructor takes a bytes32 array of length 3 as an argument. Then this array is initialized to the data
variable.
1function unlock(bytes16 _key) public {
2 require(_key == bytes16(data[2]));
3 locked = false;
4}
The function unlock()
is a public function that takes an argument of type bytes16 as input. Then it compares the bytes16 passed and the bytes16 of the 3rd element in the data
array. If both are the same, then locked
will become false.
Key Concepts to Understand
Please go through the Vault
write-up if you don’t know anything about storage layout because I won’t be explaining the storage layout here.
In the Vault
challenge WriteUp, I have clearly explained the basics of storage slots. Click here to open the WriteUp of Vault
.
Now I will explain how arrays are stored in EVM. There are two types of arrays in Solidity: fixedArray
and dynamicArray
. The two types of arrays will be stored in EVM using different methods. Check out the example below to learn how it works.
1
2contract Array_Storage_Layout{
3 uint256 private num=10;
4 bool private a=true;
5 uint256[3] private num_fixedArray=[1,2,3];
6 uint256[] private num_dynamicArray=[1,2,3];
7 uint128 private num_1=100;
8
9 function addElement_num_dynamicArray(uint256 _num)public{
10 num_dynamicArray.push(_num);
11 }
12}
Storage slot 0 contains the variable num
, slot 1
contains the variable a
.
Now if we check slot 2
, it should store the num_fixedArray
, but since it is a fixed array, each element of the array is stored in one slot. Which means slot 2
contains num_fixedArray[0]
, slot 3
contains num_fixedArray[1]
, and slot 4
contains num_fixedArray[2]
.
Now if we check the next variable, it is num_dynamicArray
, which is a dynamic array, meaning its length is not fixed. Since it is a dynamic array, if we assign num_dynamicArray[0]
to slot 5
, num_dynamicArray[1]
to slot 6
, and num_dynamicArray[3]
to slot 7
, then the last variable num_1
will be assigned to slot 8
, and this will be the last slot since there are no more state variables.
However the above is not the correct method because when we call the addElement_num_dynamicArray()
function, it will add an element to the num_dynamicArray
array. According to the storage slots of the array, the latest value should be stored in slot 8
because the last element of num_dynamicArray
is stored in slot 7
. But slot 8
is already assigned with num_1
before calling the function itself. This will lead to storage collisions.
So instead of storing the first element of the array in the slot number of the state variable, i.e., instead of storing the first element of num_dynamicArray
in slot 5
, it will store the length of num_dynamicArray
. Then the first element of num_dynamicArray
is stored at the keccak hash of slot 5
and consecutive elements in consecutive slots.
The storage layout for the above contract will be as follows:
Exploit
If you are directly solving this challenge without solving Vault
, I recommend you to go solve Vault
first and then solve this challenge.
The challenge is to make the locked
variable false. If we see the contract, the variable locked
is set to false only in the unlock()
function. We can call the unlock()
function, but we need to pass the correct key as an argument.
In the unlock()
function, it compares the key with the third element in the data
array. The data
array is a private array, which means other contracts cannot access the data
array.
We know that even if the state variable is marked as private, we cannot get its value by interacting with the contract, but we can get the private variables by going through the storage layout of the contract. This is possible only due to the transparency of the blockchain. The state variables are stored on EVM, which is part of the blockchain. The EVM is responsible for executing smart contracts and maintaining the state of the blockchain, including the storage of state variables.
The storage layout of the given contract is as follows:
Now it’s time to open the console. Open the Privacy challenge and enter ctrl
+shift
+j
to open the console.
1> await web3.eth.getStorageAt("contract.address",0)
2> await web3.eth.getStorageAt("contract.address",1)
3> await web3.eth.getStorageAt("contract.address",2)
4> await web3.eth.getStorageAt("contract.address",3)
5> await web3.eth.getStorageAt("contract.address",4)
6> await web3.eth.getStorageAt("contract.address",5)
Try out all these and check whether they exactly match the layout I have given.
Now we need data[2]
, which is stored in slot 5
. The value is 0xb86abc73432c0400110ad803960273e6cc6a889bb99e10ca45ca72c7e10d3ed6
. If we see the value, it is of size 32 bytes, but in the unlock()
function, it is comparing the key with 16 bytes of data[2]
. So the 32-byte key is explicitly converted to bytes 16.
In Solidity, when a bytes 32 is converted to bytes 16, it only takes the first 16 bytes. In our case, the bytes 32 is 0xb86abc73432c0400110ad803960273e6
, and when it is typecasted to bytes 16, the output will be 0xb86abc73432c0400110ad803960273e6
.
Now we need to pass 0xb86abc73432c0400110ad803960273e6
as an argument to unlock()
. Once we pass the value, the locked
variable will become false.
1> await contract.unlock("0xb86abc73432c0400110ad803960273e6")
Now, before submitting, we need to verify whether locked
is false or not.
1> await contract.locked()
If locked
returns false, then the challenge will be solved. You can submit the instance now.
Key Takeaways
We should not store any important data in smart contracts. Even though the state variables view is private, they can be accessed by anyone.
***Hope you enjoyed this write-up. Keep on hacking and learning!***
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